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Self-Mimetic Curved Silvering 
Dancing with Irigaray 
Joshua M. Hall 
Muskingum University 
One of Luce Irigaray’s many important contributions to philosophy consists 
in invoking dance more frequently than any other canonical Western 
philosopher. Unfortunately, however, her treatment of dance has rarely been 
treated substantively in the secondary literature, especially in regard to her 
most influential commentators, including Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz, and 
Margaret Whitford. Accordingly, I will begin my first section by situating 
the theme of dance in Irigaray’s work in the context of that of the latter three 
philosophers. I will attempt to show, moving from Butler to Grosz to 
Whitford, an increasing tolerance for, and ultimately even celebration of, 
ambivalence in the form and content of Irigaray’s work. I will then conclude 
my first section by considering Elend Summers-Bremner’s “Reading 
Irigaray, Dancing” in tandem with Gerald Jonas’ Dancing: The Power, 
Pleasure and Art of Movement. My suggestion here will be that a certain 
Irigaray-informed approach to social dance could be seen as foreshadowing 
Irigaray’s later work on a new, more positive, kind of heterosexual 
relationship. Overall, then, this first section provides the justification for my 
thematic focus on dance. 
With the dance floor thus prepared, and since most of Irigaray’s 
treatment of dance is found in her book on Nietzsche, my second section 
will then offer a close reading of that book. Though typically translated as 
Marine Lover, I will translate it here as Sea-Lover.1 Dance appears on the 
surface of Sea-Lover very pejoratively, as a privileged figure for the subject’s 
manipulation of the other into a kind of counterbalance, always at arm’s 
length, to compulsive self-fetishizing. I will suggest, however, that Irigaray’s 
attitude toward dance in Sea-Lover is instead self-consciously ambivalent, 
and that this merely apparent pejorative-ness derives from descriptions of 
dance that minimize its resonance with her concept of positive mimesis. This 
second section thus offers an example of the transformative (figurative) 
social dance suggested in my first section, namely Irigaray’s dance with 
Nietzsche. 
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To get clearer on how such dance functions as a positive mimesis, my 
final section will then turn to the two dialogical sections of This Sex… (along 
with a few passages from Speculum). Here Irigaray presents her conceptions 
of mimesis most clearly, along with what I will term “self-mimesis,” and the 
curvature and silvering of mirrors as mimetic objects. My suggestion here 
will be that it is precisely at the intersection of these four phenomena that 
dance (and especially a certain approach to social dance) could function as a 
form of positive mimesis—facilitating revolutionary social justice by an 
imitation thereof, and thereby constituting a transitional move from the 
patriarchy of today to a more egalitarian tomorrow. 
The upshot of my essay, then, is that dance functions in Irigaray’s 
work in the following three ways: as (1) a symbol of a more positive 
comportment for heterosexual relationships; (2) an indication that the 
ambivalence in Irigaray’s work is self-consciously strategic; and (3) an 
example that teases apart the concepts of negative and positive mimesis, 
specifically by fleshing out the latter. More concisely, dance constitutes a 
figure of positive ambivalence (whether between heterosexual lovers, 
participants in a philosophical dialogue, or aspects of a concept) as self-
mimetic, curved silvering in the pursuit of social justice. 
 
A Pre-Dance Warm-Up 
I begin my review of the secondary literature with Butler, in part because 
she has had the greatest influence on my own thinking. Butler’s most 
important analyses of Irigaray can be found in Gender Trouble and Bodies that 
Matter. In the former, Butler first mentions Irigaray in the context of a 
discussion of the following question: “To what degree does the body come 
into being in and through the mark(s) of gender?”2 Prior to Irigaray, Butler 
writes, the “social scientists…refer to gender as a ‘factor’ or a ‘dimension’ of 
an analysis” and “‘a mark’ of biological, linguistic, or cultural difference,” 
while for Beauvoir and her adherents “only the feminine gender is marked” 
(13). Irigaray, however, according to Butler’s dancing rhetoric, makes a new 
“move,” which “complicates the discussion further” (13, 14).  
Women, in Irigaray’s new move, “constitute a paradox, if not a 
contradiction, within the discourse of identity itself,” as “the unrepresentable” 
of that discourse (14). Put differently, women are neither represented as “the 
subject” nor as “the Other” of the subject (or its “lack”), but are instead 
excluded altogether, which also “excludes an entirely different economy of 
signification” (14). And this economy, for Irigaray, “provides a point of 
departure for a criticism of hegemonic Western representation and of the 
metaphysics of substance that structures the very notion of the subject” (14). 
Given the way this subject has been constructed, then, Butler explains, “the 
feminine could never be the mark of a subject,” nor could it be “theorized in 
terms of a determine relation between the masculine and feminine within 
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any discourse,” since all discourses “constitute so many modalities of 
phallogocentric language” (15). Butler objects, however, to what she terms 
the “globalizing reach” of Irigaray’s move, which raises the question for her 
as to whether “the failure to acknowledge the specific cultural operations of 
gender oppression” might ultimately be “itself a kind of epistemological 
imperialism” (18).  
Later in Gender Trouble, however, Butler contradicts her own previous 
claim (that the feminine is not a “lack” for Irigaray) by attributing to 
“Irigaray’s post-Lacanian reformulation of Freud” the claim that “the 
feminine is the signification of a lack” (36, 37). And in another, similar 
reversal, Butler’s next paragraph attributes to Irigaray’s “opposition to the 
phallogocentrism of Lacan” an attempt to “theorize the feminine” as “the 
unrepresentable absence effected by (masculine) denial that grounds the 
signifying economy through exclusion” (37). Appropriately, therefore, 
Butler later in Gender Trouble acknowledges some uncertainty regarding 
Irigaray, specifically regarding “whether sexuality is culturally constructed, 
or whether it is only culturally constructed within the terms of the phallus” 
(40). And this makes all the difference in how one understands Irigaray’s 
project. 
By the time of Bodies that Matter, Butler seems more affirming of 
Irigaray. Her analysis begins with Speculum’s “Une Mère de Glace,” 
including several subtle affirmations of Irigaray’s mimetic method. For one 
thing, although it mimes “the grandiosity of the philosophical errors she 
underscores,” Butler insists that it is “of course, tactical.”3 For another thing, 
regarding the metaphorical site of the “the voice of the philosophical father,” 
Butler concludes that Irigaray’s miming occupies “no place between ‘his’ 
language and ‘hers,’ but is, instead, only a disruptive movement which 
unsettles the topographical claim” as to where the voice is found (36). And 
insofar as she does occupy that site, Butler continues, Irigaray does so only 
“to show that it is occupiable, to raise the question of the cost and movement 
of that assumption” (36). 
Regarding the details of Irigaray’s mimesis, Butler writes that “the 
feminine appears for Irigaray only in catachresis, that is, in those figures that 
function improperly,” which “explains in part the radical citational practice 
of Irigaray, the catachrestic usurpation of the ‘proper’ for fully improper 
purposes” (37). Put briefly, Irigaray “mimes philosophy,” and in so doing, 
“takes on a language that effectively cannot belong to her, only to call into 
question the exclusionary roles of proprietariness that govern the use of that 
discourse” (38). For Butler, this miming reveals the following: 
Disavowed, the remnant of the feminine survives as the 
inscriptional space of that phallogocentrism, the specular surface 
which receives the marks of a masculine signifying act only to give 
J o s h u a  M .  H a l l  |  7 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXII, No 1 (2014) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2014.644 
back a (false) reflection and guarantee of phallogocentric self-
sufficiency, without making a contribution of its own” (39). 
In this way, Butler explains, something that is somehow related to the 
feminine “makes its appearance in Plato’s Timaeus as the receptacle 
(hypodoche), which is also described as the chora” (39). I say “somehow 
related” to the feminine (rather than “equal to”) here because Butler insists 
that Plato’s figures for the chora (including nurse, mother and womb) are 
specular figures which displace the feminine at the moment they purport to 
represent the feminine” (41). In other words, “the feminine exceeds its 
figuration, just as the receptacle does,” and “this unthematizability 
constitutes the feminine as the impossible yet necessary foundation of what 
can be thematized and figured” (41). 
Irigaray’s mimicry of this “feminine” in Plato, Butler claims, can be 
described as citation in the form of “an insubordination,” and an 
insubordination that thereby “calls into question the power of origination 
that Plato appears to claim for himself” (45). That is, where Plato displaces 
“maternal origin,” there Irigaray “mimes that very act of displacement” (45). 
The significance of this reading, Butler explains, is that “the feminine as 
maternal does not offer itself as an alternate origin,” and thus “one might 
reconsider the conventional characterization of Irigaray as an uncritical 
maternalist” (46). Instead, Irigaray “appears to enact the very spectre of a 
penetration in reverse—or a penetration elsewhere—that Plato’s economy 
seeks to foreclose,” a “crossing back” that “constitutes an eroticism that 
critically mimes the phallus” (46). The conceptual tool for this mimicry, 
Butler writes, is “a matter that exceeds matter,” or “an ungrounded figure, 
worrisomely speculative and catachrestic, that marks for her the possible 
linguistic site of a critical mime” (47). Following Whitford (to whom I will 
return below), Butler claims that this hyper-matter is connected to “the 
linguistic operation of metonymy” (48). And the excess of this metonymy 
“in every mime,” finally, functions “to disrupt the seamless repetition of the 
phallogocentric norm” (48).  
For Butler, however, the problem in Irigaray’s account is that this 
hyper-material metonymic move also works to “consolidate the place of the 
feminine in and as the disruptive chora” (48). But there are “good reasons,” 
Butler counters, to “reject the notion that the feminine monopolizes the 
sphere of the excluded here,” namely because others of Plato’s “Others” 
include “slaves, children, and animals” (48). Not only, Butler elaborates, will 
this “set of reverse-mimes” not be “the same as each other,” but “the 
preservation of the outside” per se is also “of equal importance,” because “to 
bring in every marginal and excluded position within a given discourse is to 
claim that a singular discourse meets its limits nowhere, that it can and will 
domesticate all signs of difference” (53). Thus, by the end of Bodies that 
Matter Butler leaves Irigaray somewhere similar to where she left her at the 
8 0  |  S e l f - M i m e t i c  C u r v e d  S i l v e r i n g  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXII, No 1 (2014) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2014.644 
end of Gender Trouble—suspicious of the imperialistic dangers in a 
potentially-overweening mimesis.  
A similar, albeit more trusting, uncertainty pervades Elizabeth Grosz’s 
approach to Irigaray. This is suggested already on the second page of her 
two chapters on Irigaray in Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists, which 
terms Irigaray’s writing “a ‘poetry’ which is necessarily innovative.”4 Grosz 
is sensitive, moreover, to the ways in which (a) Irigaray’s writings 
“reproduce the rhythms of spoken French,” and (b) Irigaray’s grammar and 
syntax “resonate with ambiguities that proliferate rather than diminish 
meanings,” complete with “irreverence,” “playful mockery” and a “sense of 
outrageousness” (101). At the same time, however, Grosz insists that 
Irigaray also possesses “rigor” and a “serious” aspect (101, 102). In other 
words, Grosz not only accepts Irigaray’s slippery polyvalence (as Butler also 
does), but even goes so far as to embrace it. 
Irigaray’s style also characterizes her relationship with 
psychoanalysis, Grosz claims, which Irigaray “does not abandon” even in 
her “most recent texts,” although she treats it as “a symptom of a broader, 
underlying cultural and intellectual misogyny” as well (103, 105). Regarding 
the latter point, Grosz notes that Irigaray considers Freud’s system 
“phallocentric,” which Grosz parses as “representational assimilation” (105). 
While Irigaray locates a “close resemblance between the unconscious in its 
relation to consciousness and women in relation to patriarchal social 
relations,” within the representational scheme of phallocentrism, this 
positioning also represents a potential strategy for resistance, with women 
figured as the “repressed” that may yet make their “return” (107). The net 
result, for Grosz, is thus that Freud is critically important as a textual source 
for Irigaray’s “deconstruction of psychoanalysis” (109). 
Before describing the details of this deconstruction, Grosz repeatedly 
insists that Irigaray’s work aims not at “a true description of women or 
femininity,” but rather “a strategic and combative understanding” (110). 
Thus, the “isomorphism” Irigaray finds “between male sexuality and 
patriarchal language” is for Grosz “not a product of nature, anatomy, a 
‘male essence’ or a neutral, transparent, reflective or ‘objective’ language,” as 
evidenced by the fact that “Irigaray carefully refers to the morphology and not 
to the anatomy of the body” (111). In other words, Grosz thinks that social 
representations produce and construct material bodies (rather than vice 
versa) for Irigaray, and thus her analysis privileges signifiers over signified. 
Given this privileging of representation over “reality,” it seems fitting 
that Grosz’s take on Irigaray’s take on Lacan’s mirror stage emphasizes 
Irigaray’s “attraction to Alice” of Wonderland (130). For Grosz, the character 
of Alice “acts as metaphor for the woman who, like Irigaray (herself an A-
Luce), steps beyond her role as the reflective other for man” (131). How, 
though, can one voluntarily stop being a metaphorical mirror while still 
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under patriarchy, or control whether at least some listeners hear one’s 
speech as representative of other (or even all) women? Grosz’s answer: 
going “through the looking-glass” with Alice, Irigaray “refused to speculate 
on what a feminine form of language would be (this involves speaking for 
other women and thus engaging in a phallocentric politics of 
representation)” (131). The implication, again, is that representation is 
phallocentric per se, as opposed to being a genre of which phallocentric 
representation might be just one pejorative species. But is it really, strictly 
impossible for there to be a non-phallocentric representation, as for example 
in Susan B. Anthony’s demands for women’s suffrage? For Grosz, the 
positive alternative to representation appears to be speaking “as” rather 
than speaking “for,” which “means to evoke rather than designate, to 
overflow and exceed all boundaries and oppositions” (132). In the example 
of Anthony, then, what is meritorious and effective in Anthony’s speech is 
her exemplarity itself, rather than that she speaks with the voice of 
something like “all womankind.” 
Moving from the mirror stage to mimesis, Grosz contextualizes 
mimesis in Freud’s account of women’s “frigidity,” which Grosz describes 
as the “refusal of a specifically genital and orgasmic sexual pleasure,” 
making the “frigid woman” someone “whose pleasures do not fit neatly into 
the male-defined structure of sexual pleasure” (133). Grosz then locates 
frigidity, more precisely, as “probably closest in form to hysteria, the 
feminine neurosis par excellence,” which for Grosz, like frigidity, “can be seen 
as the woman’s rebellion against and rejection of the requirements of 
femininity” (134). In her “corporeal discourse,” Grosz elaborates, a hysterics’ 
“symptoms commonly imitate organic disorders,” because in their 
“excessive” behavior, hysterics “mime the disorders of others” (135, emphasis 
original). For Grosz, finally, this makes the hysteric a “proto-feminist,” 
whose “overcompliance” with patriarchy is a “defiant” “parody of the 
expected” (135).  
Because this hysterical position, according to Grosz, remains today 
“one of the few possible positions that women may occupy,” Irigaray thus 
strategically “acts as a hysteric,” with mimicry that mimes not only (a) 
“philosophical and psychoanalytic texts,” but also (b) “the hysteric’s 
mimicry,” and even (c) “mime itself” (136). In other words, Irigaray mimics 
(a) the texts which articulate and theoretically justify patriarchy, as well as 
(b) the women who defy patriarchy, and even (c) the very process of 
imitation on which those women rely. “Like the hysteric,” moreover, 
Irigaray’s “techniques and procedures are pre-eminently seductive” for 
Grosz, including “amorous flirtation with phallocentric texts” that are 
ultimately “hysterical prick-teasing, phallo-deflation” (137). And it is here 
that Grosz finds the reason and justification for Irigaray’s style, which Grosz 
characterizes as “feminine in the extreme” (137). In the end, then, “Irigaray’s 
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strategy is not to use the rules to win (the game is in any case rigged) but to 
disrupt the old game in order to initiate new ones” (139). 
Of particular relevance to the present essay, Grosz also connects her 
analyses of the mirror stage and mimesis to Sea-Lover. More specifically, 
Grosz characterizes the goddesses Athena, Persephone and Ariadne as 
“three of the ‘masques’” Irigaray adopts as her own in her interrogation of 
Nietzsche in order to ‘seduce’ him…making clear Nietzsche’s own forms of 
containment of women” (163). The scene is thus set for a kind of masquerade 
ball, an elaborate evening of dance in which Irigaray will pull Nietzsche, 
three times, onto the floor as his three different dance partners. 
Athena, first, seduces Nietzsche by veiling her femininity and 
corporeality in order to redeploy “the mother’s/woman’s passion” in “the 
service of the father” (164). Athena thus “epitomizes a femininity formed in 
man’s image,” symbolizing “science and knowledge”—as, of course, a 
mirror (164). This, then, is the seduction of Nietzsche’s narcissism, his 
opportunity to dance with another who is (or seems) himself. Second, 
Persephone is also a kind of mirror, but in her case “a frozen being 
(ice/mirror = glace)” (165). Unlike Athena, therefore, Persephone is “only 
partially captured by patriarchy” thanks to the “compromises with death” of 
her mother, Ceres (165). Put simply, ice occasionally melts, as the seasons 
change, and thus Nietzsche’s second partner seduces by intermittently 
slipping fluidly from his embrace. Third and finally, Ariadne is 
“Zarathustra’s ideal woman,” whom Nietzsche tries “to contain as an 
answer to his mysteries and his questions” (167). With this dance, the two 
partners come closest to fulfillment, since “Irigaray suggests that each sex 
could have been the labyrinth for the other, both the maze (mirror-maze?) 
and the way out,” if only Nietzsche had been willing to “‘go on a fling’ 
(Irigaray, 1980:80) with her as an amorous partner” (167). 
This rhetoric of “partners” in Grosz, in addition to evoking social 
dance, is also a helpful transition to Margaret Whitford’s even more dance-
like engagement with Irigaray, in Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine.5 
Early on, Whitford observes the same ambivalence in the secondary 
literature on Irigaray that I have traced here, which Whitford terms “a 
simultaneous attraction and rejection” (4). For her part, Whitford considers 
this ambivalence as inherently good, because it is “inherent in her theory” 
that Irigaray “needs her readers and her interpreters” (5). In other words, 
without attraction and rejection, push and pull, and the ambivalence of 
intimacy (rather than fusion), without a dance with its others, Irigaray’s 
work cannot achieve its goals. Whitford concedes, though, that these 
“interpretations can either immobilize or energize,” and advocates “the 
dynamic interpretation,” with which “to engage with Irigaray in order to go 
beyond her” (6). Here, then, a new tension arises, as one partner (Whitford) 
suggests using the dance to leave the other (Irigaray) behind.  
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Related, Whitford insists that “the psychoanalytic dimension of 
Irigaray’s work,” including her practice as an analyst, is “essential to 
understanding” it (10). That is, another movement beyond, in this case 
beyond both the analyst and the analyzed, is essential to the practice of 
analysis. Psychoanalytic theory, too, is important for Whitford, who claims 
that it is “possible that some of the range of views ascribed to [Irigaray] are 
largely preoccupations of the ascribers; the opacity of her texts elicits a 
considerable degree of projection and imaginary identification, or aggressive 
rejection” (11). In other words, Irigaray psychoanalytically seduces her 
readers into unconsciously dancing with her work, and the quality of those 
dances accordingly reveals more about the (analysand) reader than Irigaray 
as the (analyst) author. 
Even more resonant with dance is Whitford’s subsequent discussion of 
Irigaray and feminist politics, beginning with a distinction between two 
kinds of utopian vision, “the kind that sees utopia as a moment of static 
perfection, in which any change can only be for the worse, and the other 
kind which is a utopia of process” (19). Irigaray’s version, for Whitford, is of 
the latter, dynamic type, and related to the static type as are Shoshana 
Felman’s “two aspects of psychoanalysis: interpretation and transference” 
(23). In “interpretation” (or “male reading”), Whitford explains, “the critic or 
reader ‘interprets’ or ‘masters’ the text” on the assumption that there is 
coherence to be found or at least established” (23). By contrast, 
“transference” (or “female reading”), “recognizes that the presumption of 
coherence is an illusion produced by the transference,” specifically the 
transference of both writer and reader (23). Thus, any transference-reading 
of Irigaray, for Whitford, is “at least partly a product of a creative dialogue 
between reader and text” (23).  
Whitford freely admits that this “transference” is “not a strategy 
without risks,” because for “a change to occur, you have to put yourself into 
play, you cannot stand back at a safe distance,” much, I would add, like 
partner dance (24). This risk, according to Whitford, is one that Irigaray 
takes consciously, “in that she wishes to occupy the positions of both analyst 
and analysand” to both “persuade her readers,” but also “allow for the 
possibility of something new emerging from the dialogue” (24). As for her 
own reading of Irigaray, Whitford sees it as “a double reading” which she 
locates “between the two reading possibilities,” with which to argue “for 
engagement with Irigaray” (25). Or, in Whitford’s even more dance-resonant 
description, “the ‘male’ and ‘female’ readings should be linked ‘both at 
once’) in a kind of creative and fertile partnership, which would correspond 
to an amorous exchange” (25). While Whitford admittedly stops just short of 
saying “dance” here, the final scholar from my brief survey does not (as I 
will relate below). 
To conclude with Whitford, she also maps these static/dynamic, 
male/female and interpretative/transferential distinctions onto her 
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discussion of mimesis. Connecting her analysis to Naomi Schor’s three levels 
of mimesis, Whitford links Schor’s most positive level to Irigaray’s dynamic 
“utopian vision” (205). Her privileged tool for interpreting Irigaray’s 
mimicry, though, is psychoanalysis. In essence, she reads Irigaray’s method 
as “initiating a process of change at the level of the social unconscious (or 
imaginary), by offering interpretations of the ‘material’ offered by society in 
its philosophical or metaphysical discourse” (72). That is, much like the 
analyst interprets the speech of the analyst specifically in order to “verbalize 
the unconscious phantasy and begin the process of lifting the repression,” 
Irigaray interprets philosophers as representatives of the collective 
unconscious of the West. Thus, where Butler sees a subversively hyperbolic 
occupation of the philosopher’s speaking position, and where Grosz sees a 
satiric meta-imitation of frigid hysteric imitation, Whitford sees the analyst’s 
therapeutic facilitation of transference. In other words, where both Butler 
and Grosz describe Irigaray as engaged in a virtuosic more-or-less solo 
dance, Whitford stages something that is unquestionably a duet.  
Turning from Whitford’s metaphorical “dance” of analyst and 
analysand to literal dancing, I will now briefly consider Summers-Bremer’s 
“Reading Irigaray, Dancing.” The central concept in this essay is the 
“sensible transcendental,” which she links (intension-ally) to both “the 
divine,” “god,” “gods” and “the angel” and (extensionally) to “the middle 
ground between masculine and feminine,” “mucous membranes” and 
dance. The connection to dance in particular, according to Summer-Bremer,6 
is facilitated by the mediation of  
the two selves [that] the classically-trained dancer learns to hold in 
tension: the self she sees from a distance in the studio mirror—body 
as passive instrument, as object of her labors—which would be the 
“woman” in the traditional binary, and the self she is while 
dancing, from which the impulse to dance itself arises, equivalent 
to “man,” the “active” part of the event (93, 94).   
By “classical” here, Summers-Bremer means her own dance tradition, ballet, 
in which the “relationship between the two selves is tyrannous,” and in 
which, “like man and woman, each exists only by repressing elements of the 
other” (95). Most of her essay, in fact, consists of a detailed analysis of ballet, 
especially the ballerina’s desire (which is unfortunately beyond the scope of 
my essay).  
The one relevant moment here, though, is her characterization of “the 
sensible transcendental as threshold” (104). Although Summers-Bremer does 
not explore this point further, it is worth mentioning that “threshold” 
derives from “thrash” (via “thresh”), an Old Germanic word which the OED 
defines as follows: “to tramp or stamp heavily with the feet,” and links to 
“the Old French trescher to dance”). One could thus describe a threshold as a 
doorway, the solid basis of which also serves for the threshing of “the grains 
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of any cereal from the husks and straw; esp. by beating with a flail.” And 
this rambunctiously noisy threshing activity, in turn, constitutes a kind of 
dance. To relate this etymological analysis back to Summers-Bremer’s own 
analysis of ballet, one could understand the female ballerina (qua subject of 
ballet’s discipline) as the human “object” of the threshold dance’s violent 
thrashing. Or, one could transpose the two figurative “selves” that 
Summers-Bremer locates within the female ballet dancer onto a relationship 
between the two literal selves of a partner dance. (In fact, Summers-Bremer 
herself makes this move in regard to the postmodern dance form called 
Contact Improvisation).7  
Consider, for example, the harvest festival known as a “threshing 
bee,” in which the violent tension between the ballerina’s selves are 
transformed into the productive tension between dance partners, thus 
symbolizing a broader transformation of women’s masochism under 
patriarchy into a kind of coordinated force for revolution—which Emma 
Goldman famously describes as not worth having without “beautiful 
radiant” dance.8 Along just such lines, Gerald Jonas claims, in Dancing: The 
Pleasure, Power and Art of Movement,9 that in the Western world, “couple 
dancing has not only reflected society’s changing attitudes toward relations 
between the sexes, it has sometimes foreshadowed them” (120). For 
example, Jonas notes that the evolution of male-female touching in Western 
medieval dance was “strongly influenced by the Crusades,” a kind of 
Dionysian easterly breeze bringing in then-revolutionary gender relations.10  
For another example, Jonas also discusses the egalitarian and 
democratic effects of the waltz, which first became popular early in the 
nineteenth century. This effect derived, Jonas explains, from the waltz’s 
original version, in which neither partner “led because no one had to; the 
steps followed a predetermined pattern, the dancers always turned in a 
predetermined direction (clockwise) while circling around the floor with all 
the other couples in a predetermined direction (counterclockwise)” (123). 
The democratic effect, by contrast, happened later. To start with, 
fewer and fewer men had the leisure or inclination to take lessons 
from a dancing instructor, by midcentury it had become necessary 
to simplify the steps; at the same time each waltzing couple was set 
free to move around as they wished without reference to the rest of 
the dancers (126).  
With this new freedom, though, came “new problems,” such as how the 
partners could “synchronize their movements with each other” without the 
group’s nested clockwise-within-counterclockwise circling (126). The 
patriarchal solution to this, finally, was to make the male partner the 
presumptive leader. Jonas, however, suggests an alternative solution, in 
which both partners could “take turns leading or flip a coin before each 
dance to see who leads” (126). 
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Fortunately, something like this alternative is already gaining ground 
in partner dancing today. One evening in 2009, I visited a Latin dance club 
in the Castro district of San Francisco where the protocol was as follows: 
when approaching a potential partner, one first asked whether s/he 
preferred to “lead” or “follow”; in response, both decided whether to join 
the dance. There was a huge crowd that day, with people of every 
imaginable gender permutation leading and following in every imaginable 
gendered combination, but I still remember my favorite dance. I, a young 
white male in jeans and a traditional button-down shirt, was dancing with a 
middle-aged woman of Afro-Cuban descent in a stylish men’s pinstripe suit. 
At first, she led and I followed, then we transitioned into a kind of 
simultaneous leading, centered on solo moves (or “shines,” in the 
vocabulary of salsa). 
Overall, our dance that day, like many others I have enjoyed over the 
years, was not at all dissimilar to a jazz jam session. Although I am aware 
that this comparison has become tiresomely repetitive (and perhaps even 
clichéd) in contemporary aesthetics, it is particularly appropriate in the case 
of salsa, since it originated as a Latinized version of the jazz genre known as 
swing dance (through the work of the legendary saxophonist “Dizzy” 
Gillespie). Salsa is thus literally a jazz dance, and the best experiences with 
salsa are powerfully reminiscent of the revolutionary power that thinkers 
such as Ralph Ellison have attributed to jazz and other syncopated and 
improvisatory Africana music.11 
To conclude, perhaps one could locate certain forms of dance (such as 
progressive social dance) at a crossroads like the one I found in San 
Francisco. Neither the ultimate destination, where men and women come 
together in perfect egalitarian embrace, nor a patriarchal theater of the 
damned, but rather a transitional site of coalitions toward a revolutionary 
break with the dominant Western gender politics. One reason this might be 
a good strategy is that such partner dance is arguably prophetic of the 
direction that Irigaray’s more recent work has taken in exploring positive 
new possibilities for heterosexual love relationship (as, for example, in I Love 
to You).12 Perhaps social dance offers the hope of a literal analogue to 
Irigaray’s figurative dances with past male philosophers such as Nietzsche.  
Relating this back to my overall thesis, this first section has attempted 
to show how dance offers a powerful symbol of a more positive 
comportment for heterosexual relationships, thereby illustrating one of my 
three examples in Irigaray’s work of positive ambivalence: ambivalence 
between heterosexual lovers. With the dancers and their parts thus chosen, I 
now turn in my second section to a close reading of Irigaray’s textual 
engagements with dance. 
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Damnably Transcendent Dances 
Sea-Lover is divided into three primary sections. The first, “Speaking of 
Immemorial Waters,” is a monologue by a female lover connected to the sea. 
The second, “Veiled Lips,” links Nietzsche’s explicit references to women to 
both Freudian psychoanalysis and Ancient Greek myth. And the third, 
“When the Gods are Born,” is a poetic reflection on the relationships among 
the specific gods Dionysius, Apollo and Jesus Christ, which also illuminates 
Nietzsche’s complicities therewith. 
The identities of both the lover and the person being addressed are 
complicated and uncertain. Possibilities for the speaker’s identity include (a) 
Irigaray herself, or (b) a representative woman under patriarchy, or (c) a 
woman in a romantic relationship with the addressee. Possibilities for the 
addressee’s identity, in turn, include (a) Nietzsche, or (b) a Nietzschean 
philosopher, or (c) a representative man under patriarchy. To keep all of 
these possibilities in play, I will continue to refer to these two 
persons/personas as “speaker” (to privilege the poetic aspect) and 
“addressee.” 
In this vein, it is also important to keep in mind the above discussion 
of Irigaray’s method of mimesis, which here takes the form of a dance with 
Nietzsche—including with his own “dance” with dance. Thus, any 
apparently negative value judgments regarding dance here cannot be 
automatically attributed to Irigaray. Other apparent possibilities for the 
source of this negativity, at least at the outset, are (a) Nietzsche’s own 
thought and (b) the figurate dance between him and Irigaray. To get clearer 
on the former possibility, it will be helpful to consider briefly Kimerer 
LaMothe’s analysis in her recent book, Nietzsche’s Dancers.13  
“More of than not,” according to LaMothe, “Nietzsche uses dance 
strategically,” specifically “in the process of revaluing Christian values” (2). 
The core of this revaluating method is found early on in LaMothe’s 
chronological reading of Nietzsche’s corpus (stretching from The Birth of 
Tragedy to his 1888 writings). Beginning with the former, she writes that 
Nietzsche interprets Attic tragedy as “a performance art” in which dance is 
central (25). “In so far as the elemental rhythms of the singing and dancing 
spark a visceral identification of spectator with chorus,” LaMothe claims, “the 
spectator is drawn to see herself in the image of a satyr and thus see herself 
in relation to the dramatic narrative on stage as the agent through which the 
characters of that narrative come to life” (25). As she elaborates later, the 
spectator both moves involuntarily and also imagines moving during the 
chorus’ dance, which causes the spectator to identify at the muscular level 
with the dancers dressed as gods—and thus the spectators feel/see 
themselves as gods. 
Moving forward to Human, All too Human, LaMothe distinguishes two 
levels in Nietzsche’s conception of metaphor. The primary level consists of 
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gestural symbols in which the body’s meaning-making power is evident, 
and the derivative level consists of verbal language, whose characteristic 
feature is deluding us into thinking that meaning comes from language 
rather than the body. And the historical shift from the first to the second 
level, a combination of “desensualization” and “oversensitized emotions,” is 
for LaMothe the true meaning of “decadence” for Nietzsche (37). 
Appropriately, then, the embodiment-affirming art of dance helps resist 
decadence, specifically by valorizing the senses (contra desensualization), 
which in turn restores emotional stability (contra these over sensitized 
emotions). Against this background, LaMothe then defines Nietzsche’s “free 
spirit” as “one whose relationship to his bodily being is transformed such 
that he is able to experience his own pain and suffering—not just suffering 
in general—as a stimulant” (38). Hearkening back to her analysis of The Birth 
of Tragedy, LaMothe claims that, just as Attic tragedy for Nietzsche oscillates 
between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, so the dancing free spirit can 
“move between the illusion of science’s truth and the truth of art’s illusion,” 
and thereby “we reclaim our relationship to our bodies as rhythms that 
produce ideas” (42). 
Through her readings of The Gay Science and Thus Spake Zarathustra, 
finally, LaMothe generates her original concept of “theopraxis,” the 
activity—symbolized and/or enacted in a privileged way by dance—by 
which humans create and asymptotically embody our gods, “a 
complementary process for creating and becoming our highest ideals of self” 
(48).  Again recalling her account of Attic tragedy, LaMothe claims that 
Zarathustra’s love “for humanity” is enacted via “a visceral identification 
between reader and Zarathustra such that readers come to hear Nietzsche’s 
rhythms of poetry and song through their bodies” and thereby “feel compelled 
to imitate Zarathustra’s gestures” of dance (57). And in his dance, finally, 
Zarathustra “has a double experience of himself akin to that occasioned by 
Attic tragedy and characteristic of the dramatic, dancing art that Nietzsche 
describes in [The Gay] Science” (63).14 
An evaluation of LaMothe’s intriguing claims here is unfortunately 
beyond the scope of the present essay. Her narrative is helpful, though, in 
summarizing the major moments in which dance figures in Nietzsche’s 
work. In LaMothe’s own concise formulation, “Dancing is (1) a discipline for 
self-knowledge in which a person (2) strengthens the instincts; (3) educates 
the senses, and (4) invigorates the energy needed to embrace metaphor-
making as a creative, bodily process” (91).  
Returning, then, from LaMothe to Irigaray, the first section of Sea-
Lover is further divided into eighteen subsections. In the first of these 
subsections, the speaker links dance metonymically to an indefinitely 
repeated, solitary circling in the void. “For round and round,” the speaker 
remarks to the addressee, “you keep on turning” (4). This trope of solipsistic 
circling, moreover, is one that recurs throughout Irigaray’s book. 
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The second subsection turns explicitly to dance in its first paragraph, 
with the dance of the “higher men” from Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra.15 If, the speaker asks, “the unique question of a master,” 
alluding to the death of God, “brings about such a change,” namely from 
nihilism to life-affirmation, “then if the dance is yours, oh higher men, or the 
dance of the ass, what does it matter!” (8) Here the pejorative connotation 
attached to dance seems to derive not from dance per se, but rather from the 
context in which it is practiced. The only evaluative possibility that this 
claim rules out, therefore, is that dance might be so intrinsically good that it 
could transform an inherently bad context into something positive (which 
Nietzsche himself frequently suggests).  
Irigaray’s later mention of dance in this subsection is similarly 
ambivalent, this time in reference to Nietzsche’s übermensch, “who has 
already given up the use of his legs and the dances of a man in favor of 
wings” and who “hears another toll of the bell.”16 The implication is that 
dance is positive at least compared with flight, presumably because dance is 
more closely tethered to the earth, and thus also to the sea. Interestingly on 
this note, the Olympic sport currently known as “synchronized swimming” 
was originally called “water ballet,” in virtue of its bodily discipline and 
grace; other similar examples, moreover, include diving and ice dancing, all 
of which suggests that dance is not inherently anti-water. Irigaray, however, 
repeatedly presents dancing and swimming as mutually exclusive, for 
example in dance’s next appearance, in the third subsection. “Are you fish or 
eagle,” the speaker asks, “swimmer or dancer, when you announce the 
decline of man”? The speaker then rebukes the addressee-as-Nietzsche as 
follows: “you never choose a sea creature for your companion”; instead, he 
always wishes “for legs, or wings,” rather than “gills” (13). Consequently, 
according to the speaker, it “is always hot, dry, and hard in your world” 
(13). Irigaray returns to this point again in the ninth section, where the 
speaker exhorts the addressee to “swim, as you once danced on dry land” 
(37). Whether or not this alternative is ultimately false, however, dance for 
Irigaray is not intrinsically negative.  
In contrast to this emerging pattern of contextual critique, however, 
the fourth subsection includes two more essentialist critiques of dance, one 
negative and one positive. First, the speaker criticizes the addressee for (his) 
vague “crimes,” including making “tragedies merely into an occasional floor 
to dance on” (22). Although the context here remains important, it is 
nevertheless true that all dancing is to some degree an exploitative covering-
over of the tragic dimension of human life (insofar, that is, as all dancers are 
vulnerable embodied beings that must transvalue suffering in order to 
engage joyfully in dance). Two pages later, however, the speaker exclaims, 
“If I didn’t have to bear your ills, how I should dance!” (24). In light of this 
remark, the previous criticisms could perhaps be reinterpreted as springing 
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from a justifiable resentment toward a practice that has been restricted to her 
(male) other and facilitated by his continued exploitation of her. 
 Although all the preceding discussions of dance are admittedly brief, a 
few subsections later the following, lengthier meditation on dance 
introduces a new level into Irigaray’s discussion: 
It is your fortune that life and death are forever entwined, that the 
one and the other together move you. And that, no sooner do you 
run after the one, than the other seizes your will. Eternally an 
infernal dance is danced within you. But it is your own! And ever 
the same and identical it begins once again (40). 
This new level is thus a kind of figurative dance within the addressee’s 
dancing self.  
Dance achieves even greater prominence in Irigaray’s eleventh 
subsection, “Dance of the Abyss”, which includes the following, even 
lengthier reflection: 
And your nostalgia for women means that, outside of women, you 
never complete your first step. Before establishing its completion, 
you stop. Before any boundaries can be marked, before any first 
distance away from women can be established to distinguish your 
shapes, you cease walking. Between the time your first step steps 
off and arrives, you start to dance. Between the one and the other, 
on a tightrope that holds you up, you jump… But it is within the 
one step that the soaring of your rhythm is lost… At the center you 
dance, upon a nothing in common… Turning endlessly in the 
abyss, and finding in that movement a fragile equilibrium (44, 45). 
To paraphrase this passage, and thereby the entire first section of Sea-Lover, 
the addressee’s fault lies in his (a) allowing insufficient separation between 
self and other to allow the other to be in her difference, and (b) having 
instead begun a solipsistic dance, which (c) stretches out and tortures an 
(umbilical) elastic cord connecting him to her, and all in order to (d) achieve 
an endlessly repeated circular dance which he then (e) misperceives as 
flight. 
Dance here is thus reduced to the masturbatory “coping mechanism” 
of a male who cannot achieve full independence from his mother, without 
which any egalitarian relationship between him and any woman remains 
impossible. Though the speaker concedes that this dancer is, in a way, 
beautiful, his dance remains parasitic on an endless series of women whom 
he reduces to the stage for his dancing blows. 
Having considered Irigaray’s use of dance in the first section of Sea-
Lover, I will now, for reasons of space, briefly summarize its use in the 
book’s third major section, “When the Gods Are Born.” Its first subsection is 
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devoted to Dionysius in particular. The most important thing here for my 
purposes is that it contains problematic accounts of—and problematic 
linkages of dance to—the bacchantes, miracles, trances, heaven and hell, 
artificiality, “savagery,” and a kind of pathological reservedness. This latter 
term is particularly significant, because it strikes me as Irigaray’s most 
important implied criticism of dance. The reason for this is that, if Irigaray is 
right about dance’s reserved-ness, then dance might indeed be constitutively 
problematic, amounting, in effect, to an almost-sex/intimacy that stops just 
before membranes’ fluid encounter. If she is wrong, however, then that 
wrongness might constitute another reason to think that at least certain 
forms of dance might provide another strategic resource in regard to 
Irigaray’s alleged naturalistic essentialism.17 
Returning to this series of seven terms as a whole (bacchantes, 
miracles, trances, heaven/hell, artificiality, savagery, and pathological 
reservedness), one might wonder what something would have to be in order 
to constitute a node in this web of phenomena. Is it even possible for an 
entity to bind all these characteristics into the integrity of a fixed identity? 
One candidate might be something like a divinely-intoxicated hunter, ever-
swiftly fleeing the torment of exile, lashing out in mad, convulsive gestures 
that nevertheless have miraculous results. And if so, a more specific 
candidate might then be the ballerina onstage. In sympathy with the 
mysterious being, born from the aforementioned series of terms, the 
ballerina could be described aptly as temporarily exiled from “real life” to 
the stage, intoxicated with the ecstasy of her performance, and perpetually 
torn asunder by pain and exhaustion, and all in pursuit of the elusive goal of 
perfect appearance, achieved through swift, repeated convulsions that are 
nevertheless, at their best, almost miraculously beautiful. 
Regarding these tortured female dancers, Irigaray asks, “Does the god 
already love them so that he can make them into a work of art?” Her 
suggestion seems to be that Dionysius uses the female dancers to create a 
new form of manipulation, “the lure of women whom mortals may not 
touch,” nor “enfold in carnal embrace” (141). This lure, in turn, constitutes 
the birth of the momentously important “eternal feminine” itself, in which, 
Irigaray writes, women “enter into mime when the man-god is at hand” 
(141). “Forgetting their own desire,” she continues, “in the paroxystic 
exaltation of his. Is this not women’s nature? After the creation of the world 
by a God” (141). 
The dancer, Irigaray concludes, is “touched by celestial love, perfected 
into an immortal image,” and tempted, along with her sister-dancers, “to 
become visible from a great distance. To shine with a brilliance that halts the 
gesture. Remaining, in some celestial configuration, untouched and 
untouchable” (142). Here, the dancer is the perfect mime of the addressee, 
Ariadne to Nietzsche’s übermensch—he the object of masochistic pain, and 
she, the object of its sadistic counterbalance. (La) dancer-mime of (le) dancer-
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mime. Even granting this conclusion, however, can this really all there is for 
Irigaray to dance? 
I would suggest, on the contrary, that dance is revealed here as 
centrally important, not merely as a negative force, but rather as an abject-ed 
material support for Irigaray’s entire philosophy. A “support” because she 
reconceives Dionysius here—specifically through dance—as the creator of 
her centrally-important concept of mimicry. And “abject-ed,” because no 
mention is made here of mimesis’ good side. To put it in the terms of This 
Sex…, there are “two mimeses”; one, “as production,” lies “more in the realm 
of music,” while the other “would be already caught up in a process of 
imitation, specularization, adequation, and reproduction” (131, emphasis 
original). The former constitutes the site of women’s bondage under 
patriarchy, while the other constitutes Irigaray’s own revolutionary 
philosophical methodology. That dance could be a part of this latter mimesis 
is suggested by its intimacy with music, both in general and for the Ancient 
Greeks in particular.  
With this section, then, I have tried to show that the ambivalence in 
Irigaray’s philosophy (in this case, regarding dance in Sea Lover) is self-
consciously strategic, thereby illustrating the second of my three examples in 
Irigaray’s work of positive ambivalence: ambivalence between participants 
in a philosophical dialogue. With the broader choreographic formations of 
this dialogical ambivalence in place, I will now refocus on the individual 
dancers’ technique: the conceptual ambivalence within mimesis. 
 
Subversively Mimetic Dances 
Although I will discuss both This Sex Which Is Not One and Speculum of the 
Other Woman,18 I will focus on the former because of its conversational 
sections (which strike me as more appropriate for dance) and its particularly 
clear discussions of mimesis. Specifically, I will explore the following four 
figures: (1) mimesis/mimicry in general, (2) reflexive mimicry or self-
mimicry, and the potential (3) curvature and (4) silvering of mirrors as 
mimetic objects. These correspond to the origin/materials for mimesis, the 
novel application of those materials, the primary obstacle to that novel 
application, and the means of overcoming that obstacle, respectively. In 
other words, I will offer a novel interpretation of Irigaray’s conception of 
mimesis by breaking it down into its three constituent aspects, which 
constitute a Nietzschean genealogy of positive mimesis.  
In approaching the first of these figures, it is worth noting that dance’s 
sole appearance in This Sex comes at a crucial moment, in the middle of the 
first chapter (an adaptation of director Michael Soutter’s film, The Surveyors). 
“The looking glass dissolves,” Irigaray writes, “already broken. Where are 
we? How far along? Everything is whirling. Everyone is dancing” (15). The 
J o s h u a  M .  H a l l  |  9 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXII, No 1 (2014) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2014.644 
meaning and importance of this appearance, however, only become clear 
later. After declaring that “what is most strictly forbidden to women today is 
that they should attempt to express their own pleasure,” Irigaray adds that 
such pleasure “can only be found at the price of crossing back through the 
mirror that subtends all speculation” (77, emphasis original). 
This important passage comes at the end of an even more important 
passage, the entirety of which is applicable to mimesis in general, as it 
constitutes an elaboration on “crossing back through the mirror.” First, 
Irigaray explains that, in regard to the feminist movement’s struggle to 
overcome the phallocratic order, there is “in an initial phase, perhaps only 
one ‘path,’ the one historically assigned to the feminine: that of mimicry” 
(76). At the literal level (Irigaray’s privileged figure for which is the mirror) 
this “crossing back through” would amount to breaking the mirror and 
getting bloodied in the process. (And this is exactly what Irigaray describes 
as happening to Alice in this chapter). Irigaray is more concerned, however, 
with the metaphorical level. Her privileged figure for this is “woman” under 
patriarchy shaped into a figurative mirror, the primary purpose of which is 
to reflect male subjectivity. At this metaphorical level, then, “crossing back” 
might be described as the similarly-painful destruction of the cultural 
construct “woman.” 
Irigaray elaborates on this process in the next few sentences. “One 
must assume the feminine role deliberately. Which already means to convert 
a form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus to begin to thwart it. 
To play with mimesis,” Irigaray continues, “is thus, for a woman, to try to 
recover the place of her exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself 
to be simply reduced to it” (76). In other words, a mirror that is overdoing its 
job as a mirror, trying to mirror too much, or at the wrong time, already 
problematizes its status as mirror, and perhaps even the act of mirroring per 
se. This means, Irigaray explains in her very next sentence 
to resubmit herself—inasmuch as she is on the side of the 
“perceptible,” of “matter”—to “ideas,” in particular to ideas about 
herself, that are elaborated in/by a masculine logic, but so as to 
make ‘visible,’ by an effect of playful repetition, what was 
supposed to remain invisible: the cover-up of a possible operation 
of the feminine in language (76).  
Put differently, rather than merely serving passively as a mirror to the 
masculine ego, the hyperbolically-mirroring woman instead pretends to 
play patriarchal discourse’s game, by actively requesting that her status as 
mirror be repeatedly taken up in discourse. And in so doing, she creates the 
possibility that the male subject will begin to realize just how unnecessary 
and counterintuitive women’s role under patriarchy is. 
To play with mimesis “also means,” Irigaray continues, “‘to unveil’ 
the fact that, if women are such good mimics, it is because they are not 
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simply resorbed in this function. They also remain elsewhere: another case of 
the persistence of ‘matter,’ but also of ‘sexual pleasure’” (76). Put differently, 
the consummate mime can mime a large number of phenomena, which 
implies a more expansive ability outstripping the mimicking of any one 
phenomenon. Thus, one can never witness directly the full range of the 
expert mime’s powers—even though this range is the very condition for the 
possibility of any given performance. 
One example of this, which draws on women as both literal and 
figurative mirrors, is the famous scene from the “I Love Lucy Show” in 
which Lucille Ball, disguised as Harpo Marx and standing opposite the real 
Harpo in a doorway, begins to mimic his actions so expertly that it almost 
looks like he is standing in front of a mirror. One could interpret this scene 
(and by extension both the character of “Lucy” and Lucille Ball’s career) as 
exactly the kind of subversive, self-affirming parody that Irigaray is 
describing. More specifically, by pretending to be his literal reflection, 
“Lucy” shows Harpo (and Ball shows the audience) how good she is at 
miming anyone or anything (including, and perhaps especially, a 
stereotypically ambitious, narcissistic Western man). In that demonstration, 
moreover, the viewer already begins to appreciate how far “Lucy’s” (and 
Ball’s) abilities exceed the restrictions of stereotypical femininity. (And 
indeed, Lucille Ball’s brilliant career has been instrumental in re-signifying 
womanhood in the United States and beyond). 
To recap this discussion of the first figure (mimesis per se), I will now 
summarize the relationship of this concept to dance with four observations. 
First, there is a well-known historical overlap between dance and 
mime/pantomime, which famously reached its zenith in Ancient Greece and 
Rome.19 Second, my example of “Lucy” (without any premeditation on my 
part) concerns a woman who was herself an actor and dancer, thereby 
calling to mind the even larger historical overlap between dance and 
acting.20 Third (as I have described at length elsewhere), dancers experience 
a powerful and singular relationship to mirrors due to the format of 
traditional dance instruction, which resonates (albeit to a much lesser 
degree) with the embodied experiences of disempowered persons in 
Western culture (such as women and people of color).21 Finally, dancing too 
requires the ability, only partially transparent in any given performance, to 
produce an indefinitely large repertoire of distinct movements. 
What happens, though, when two mimes meet? How might one 
imagine an alternate version of the Lucy-and-Harpo scene in which a 
second, similarly talented mimic tries to replicate Lucy’s movements? In 
short, insofar as women are mirrors, what happens when a woman stands 
before another literal or figurative mirror? The answer to this question is the 
second of my four figures, “self-mimicry,” as elaborated in the chapter of 
This Sex… entitled “Cosí Fan Tutti.” Literally translated “Thus do all 
women,” the title is an allusion to Mozart’s opera of the same name, the 
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subject of which opera is a wager regarding women’s sexual fidelity, the 
(familiar) conclusion of which is that women are inherently inconstant. The 
thesis of Irigaray’s chapter, however, is that women are determined by 
psychoanalysis as constitutively incapable of self-understanding, and that 
this self-understanding is (in the modified words of the title) what, 
allegedly, “all women [can’t] do.” 
Importantly, this second chapter is a deconstructive reading of Jacques 
Lacan’s work, and in particular of his aforementioned concept of “the mirror 
stage” of human development. The most direct exposition of this concept in 
Lacan’s own writings can be found in his 1949 speech at the Sixteenth 
International Congress of Psychoanalysis, entitled “The Mirror Stage as 
Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience.”22 
The speech introduces the “mirror stage” as a definite mark of Lacan’s 
rejection of the Cartesian cogito, and then turns to the following scientific 
basis: “the human child, at an age in when he is for a short while, but for a 
while nevertheless, outdone by the chimpanzee in instrumental intelligence, 
can already recognize his image as such in a mirror” (94). What is at stake in 
this stage is the (grammatically) male subject’s restoration to dominant 
singularity after his previous humiliations at the hands of Freud and 
Darwin. That is, though “he” has lost much instrumental control over the 
world, “man” remains, for Lacan, the only being that can recognize his own 
image as such.  
Lacan’s name for the evidence for this mirror phase is “illuminative 
mimicry,” through which the subject “playfully experiences” his 
relationship to his image. It is essentially, Lacan adds, “an identification”—
defined as “the transformation that takes place in the subject when he 
assumes [assume] an image” (94). And the overall function of this mirror 
stage is “to establish a relationship between an organism and its reality” 
(96). One necessary part or aspect of this reality, however, has been 
minimized almost to invisibility in Lacan’s account, namely the mirror 
itself—along with the “prop, human or artificial” which holds the “little 
man” steady, when too young to stand, long enough to see his image (94). 
And it is here where Irigaray’s reading intervenes.  
Women can increase men’s understanding, Irigaray observes in 
regards to Lacan’s narrative, by reflecting truths to the men like mirrors. In 
other words, women on this account remain ever the vehicle, never the 
“Subject,” of reflection, especially in regard to women’s pleasure, “a state 
about which,” Irigaray writes, “women know nothing, from which they do 
not—therefore—truly derive pleasure” (96). As she puts it on the next page, 
women under patriarchy “don’t have a soul; they serve as a guarantee for 
man’s” (97). And since the soul too is a kind of mirror, Irigaray describes 
women as mirrors lacking their own internal mirrors (101). If present, such 
internal mirrors would enable women to reflect their own internality back to 
themselves, thus facilitating the self-knowledge women allegedly lack. 
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Or, as Irigaray explains in the key paragraph in this chapter for dance, 
the “Other,” or woman-as-mirror, “would be subject to inscription without 
its knowledge” (101). Revisiting her famous analysis of Plato’s “Allegory of 
the Cave” from Speculum, Irigaray observes that 
The receptacle can reproduce everything, ‘mime’ everything, except 
itself: it is the womb of mimicry. The receptacle would thus in some 
way know everything—since it receives everything—without 
knowing anything about it, and especially without knowing itself 
(101).  
The word “receptacle” here refers to Irigaray’s interpretation of Plato’s cave 
(and especially the wall of shadows) as a figure for the womb. I would add, 
moreover, that this this receptacle is also linked to Plato’s concept of the 
chora, which can be independently linked to the choreo-graphy of dance.23 In 
light of these connections between the cave, womb, chora and dance, one 
could argue that dance could function on Irigaray’s terms as a special type of 
receptacle that goes beyond the limitations of Plato’s cave. Put simply, dance 
is a receptacle that (in certain forms and contexts) can and does mime itself. 
In dance, then, women as mirrors meet—thus responding to Irigaray’s 
remark, that “Women lack a mirror for becoming women.”24 
In other words, dance is, among other things, a practice wherein 
women and men can imitate the mimesis into which phallocracy forces 
women (as illustrated by the work of many of the most prominent 
choreographers of the twentieth century, such as George Balanchine and 
Merce Cunningham). Additionally, this self-mimetic power might be even 
stronger in social partner dances, with the partners understood as doubling 
this self-imitating movement, imitating each other’s imitations. One example 
of the latter phenomenon is the early Argentine tango, self-consciously 
structured to pantomime the entire course of a seduction (including the 
initial encounter, flirtation, resistance, jealousy, obsession, and 
consummation). 
As the example of dance suggests, however, self-mimicry requires 
more than just two figurative mirrors merely standing immobile. It also 
requires a literal or figurative instance of the third of these four figures, 
“curvature.” Irigaray presents curvature most clearly in the second 
dialogical chapter of This Sex in answer to her dissertation committee’s final 
question, “What are the conclusions of your work?” (153). In condensed form, 
her three-part answer is as follows: (1) Freud failed to explicitly account for 
“the role of sexualization in discourse itself”; (2) successfully doing so, in his 
footsteps, might “open up the possibility of a different relation to the 
transcendental” (which would amount to constructing it, for the first time, 
as the “copula,” or “copulative operation between the sexes in language”); 
and (3) this in turn would require that “the feminine” be “granted its own 
‘specificity’ in language” (153).  
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Irigaray explains that her method for achieving this three-part 
conclusion in her dissertation (that is, Speculum) was to go “back through the 
process of specula(riza)tion that subtends our social and cultural 
organization”—or, one might also say, “to go back through the looking 
glass”—“to discover what it may have kept suspended in the blaze of its 
brilliance, what it may have congealed in its decisive cut, what it may have 
frozen of the ‘other’s’’ flowing, and vice versa” (154). In order to thus go 
“back through,” finally, Irigaray claims,  
it was necessary to put into place a mode of specularization that 
allows for the relation of woman to “herself” and her like. Which 
presupposed a curved mirror, but also one that is folded back on itself, 
with its impossible reappropriation “on the inside” of the mind, of 
thought, of subjectivity. Whence the intervention of the speculum and 
of the concave mirror, which disturb the staging of representation 
according to too-exclusively masculine parameters (154-155). 
To explore what this new “specularization” might “look” like, I would like 
to propose a necessarily inadequate example, namely a female dancer 
curving her arms before a wall of mirrors. On Irigaray’s terms, this 
phenomenon could be described as a literally-curved figurative mirror being 
reflected by a non-curved literal mirror. Or, better, imagine two female 
dancers doing this same arm-curving move, perhaps simultaneously 
critiquing each other’s technique. This modified example, for Irigaray, 
would then constitute two literally-curved figurative mirrors reflecting each 
other. Or, better still, imagine that both of these female dancers are feminists 
(perhaps of the Irigarayan variety). This, for Irigaray, would amount to the 
mutual reflection of two figurative mirrors, both literally and figuratively 
curved. Or, best of all, imagine again the first, solitary dancer, curving her 
body over on itself, both interpreting that literal curvature and also 
reflecting to herself about its reflecting the metaphorical curvature effected 
by her feminist philosophy. In fact, this result is not hypothetical at all, since 
it is an apt interpretation of what takes place in Summers-Bremer’s 
aforementioned “Reading Irigaray, Dancing.”25 
Irigaray also discusses curvature briefly in several moments in 
Speculum, beginning with the first subsection of the second section, “Korē: 
Young Virgin, Pupil of the Eye.” Here Irigaray observes that “in a concave 
mirror with a vertical generatrix, man may be reflected upside down” (149). 
Moreover, the concave mirror also possesses the “potential for setting things 
afire” (149). The curvature of concavity enacts not only qualitative changes 
(such as distortions or inflections), but also dichotomous flipping or 
reversals (suggesting perhaps a Nietzschean revaluation of values), and 
even conflagrations or combustions (suggesting perhaps the pure 
destruction of the Nietzschean “laughing lion”). Similarly, dance too is often 
described as (for better or worse) both inspiring social upheaval and also 
“setting fire” to spectators’ desires. 
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The next curvature discussion in Speculum is found in the seventh 
subsection of this section, wherein Irigaray notes, with reference to the 
(male) analyst, that “the curved nature” of woman’s “lines” will not  
drive him away from an art of geo-metry in which he excels, 
applying it with arrogant confidence in the more and more twisted 
spaces that had hitherto been out of reach of mathematical 
prospection, given over to the imaginative fancies of man” (186).  
The point seems to be that curvature in itself is no adequate defense against 
phallocracy, as evidenced by the ingenuity of psychoanalysis, which has 
supplied both sides in the “gender wars” with newer, more sophisticated 
weapons. For yet another reason, therefore, dance is not necessarily positive 
or liberating for Irigaray either, as she suggests by finishing the following 
paraphrase of this same point with a technical ballet term: when the male 
analyst takes account of “those curves,” everything “has to be rethought in 
terms of curl(s), helix(es), diagonal(s), spiral(s), roll(s), twirl(s), revolution(s), 
pirouette(s)” (238). Put differently, dance is not the exclusive privilege of 
women or feminists; on the contrary, patriarchal institutions too have 
learned to “dance” in order to maximize their exploitation of their “dancing” 
female “objects.” 
There is a particular danger in dance, moreover, as a feminist symbol 
and practice, namely seeing dance as the privileged purview of women or 
the feminine. Fortunately, a formidable defense against this danger—which 
emphasizes the constructed-ness of mirrors, and thereby implies that men 
too are equally capable of becoming mirrors—is found in the fourth of my 
figures, “silvering.” In technical terms, silvering, also known as “silver 
backing” (as Irigaray explains in the aforementioned second section of 
Speculum) is the metallic coating added to one side of a piece of glass in 
order to render it reflective, thus transforming mere glass into a mirror. 
With regard to the male psyche, Irigaray remarks that the “notion that, 
like a mirror, he might be passed through and have a silver backing, that he 
might reflect and be reflected in different ways, is in some sense denied” by 
psychoanalysis (and Western thought in general).26 In other words, men too 
for Irigaray can be metaphorical mirrors—albeit in virtue of possessing an 
(at least grammatically) feminine attribute or aspect (the feminine la 
psyché)—and thus also can be, like Alice’s famous looking glass, “crossed 
back through.” (Perhaps, moreover, given the mirror/mimesis/dance 
connection, this is especially true of the man who is a dancer)?27  
In conclusion, Irigaray observes that mirrors exhibit a kind of violent 
excess, an overflowing mimetic power which they are forced to channel into 
the egos of those who make them mirrors, put them into place, and stand 
imperiously before them. No matter how much control the male subject 
desires and exerts, however, the fact that the mirror is (necessarily) capable 
of mimicking infinitely more than his own particular image remains as an 
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implicit threat to his power. Although there is one apparent limit to the 
mirror’s power (that it cannot seem to mirror itself), even this can be 
ultimately overcome by the co-presence of two mirrors (such as the two 
“figurative” mirrors constituted by two dancers). That is, although a woman 
cannot see her own singular self in another mirror, she can see her own 
mirroring power (into which her self is pigeonholed by patriarchy) as 
amplified in the mirroring power of the other. And this facilitates her active 
shaping of herself as a mirror, or taking ownership and control of her own 
mimicry for her own ends. At the same time, though, the example of 
dancing also illustrates that the mere co-presence of mirrors is insufficient 
for this happy result, and instead requires the torsioning transformation of 
curvature. And on this note, the silver lining of mimesis, since mirrors (like 
women for Beauvoir) are not born, but rather made (by silvering), men too, 
properly silvered by the right approach to social dance (among other 
things), can participate in this self-overcoming mimicry toward social 
justice. 
This final section, then, has attempted to clarify the difference between 
negative and positive mimesis in Irigaray’s thought by fleshing out the 
latter, thereby illustrating the last of my three examples in Irigaray’s work of 
positive ambivalence: ambivalence between two or more aspects of a single 
concept. Along with dance’s other two functions (as a symbol of a better 
comportment between heterosexual lovers, and an image of a strategic 
ambivalence manifested in dialogues between Irigaray and her readers), this 
reveals the importance of dance in Irigaray’s philosophy—as a figure of self-
mimetic, curved silvering in pursuit of social justice. 
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